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- """The match_hostname() function from Python 3.3.3, essential when using SSL."""
- # Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
- # stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
- import re
- import sys
- # ipaddress has been backported to 2.6+ in pypi. If it is installed on the
- # system, use it to handle IPAddress ServerAltnames (this was added in
- # python-3.5) otherwise only do DNS matching. This allows
- # util.ssl_match_hostname to continue to be used in Python 2.7.
- try:
- import ipaddress
- except ImportError:
- ipaddress = None
- __version__ = "3.5.0.1"
- class CertificateError(ValueError):
- pass
- def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
- """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
- """
- pats = []
- if not dn:
- return False
- # Ported from python3-syntax:
- # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
- parts = dn.split(r".")
- leftmost = parts[0]
- remainder = parts[1:]
- wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
- if wildcards > max_wildcards:
- # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
- # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
- # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
- # reasonable choice.
- raise CertificateError(
- "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
- )
- # speed up common case w/o wildcards
- if not wildcards:
- return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
- # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
- if leftmost == "*":
- # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
- # fragment.
- pats.append("[^.]+")
- elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
- # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
- # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
- else:
- # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
- # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
- for frag in remainder:
- pats.append(re.escape(frag))
- pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
- return pat.match(hostname)
- def _to_unicode(obj):
- if isinstance(obj, str) and sys.version_info < (3,):
- # ignored flake8 # F821 to support python 2.7 function
- obj = unicode(obj, encoding="ascii", errors="strict") # noqa: F821
- return obj
- def _ipaddress_match(ipname, host_ip):
- """Exact matching of IP addresses.
- RFC 6125 explicitly doesn't define an algorithm for this
- (section 1.7.2 - "Out of Scope").
- """
- # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
- # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
- ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(ipname).rstrip())
- return ip == host_ip
- def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
- """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
- SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
- rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
- CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
- returns nothing.
- """
- if not cert:
- raise ValueError(
- "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
- "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
- "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
- )
- try:
- # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
- host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_to_unicode(hostname))
- except ValueError:
- # Not an IP address (common case)
- host_ip = None
- except UnicodeError:
- # Divergence from upstream: Have to deal with ipaddress not taking
- # byte strings. addresses should be all ascii, so we consider it not
- # an ipaddress in this case
- host_ip = None
- except AttributeError:
- # Divergence from upstream: Make ipaddress library optional
- if ipaddress is None:
- host_ip = None
- else:
- raise
- dnsnames = []
- san = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
- for key, value in san:
- if key == "DNS":
- if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- elif key == "IP Address":
- if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if not dnsnames:
- # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
- # in subjectAltName
- for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
- for key, value in sub:
- # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
- # must be used.
- if key == "commonName":
- if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if len(dnsnames) > 1:
- raise CertificateError(
- "hostname %r "
- "doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
- )
- elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
- raise CertificateError("hostname %r doesn't match %r" % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
- else:
- raise CertificateError(
- "no appropriate commonName or subjectAltName fields were found"
- )
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